نوع مقاله : پژوهشی
نویسنده
دانشگاه شهید مطهری
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
With a descriptive-analytical approach, this article deals with the reasons that William Hasker and Charles Taliaferro put forward on behalf of materialist theologians in favor of the identification of the resurrection body with the worldly material body. On the one hand, the purpose of this article is to evaluate the reasonableness of the five reasons given by Hick, Baker, Corcoran, van Inwagen, and Zimmerman, respectively, as philosophers of the philosophy of religion in the field of resurrection, in favor of the corporeality of the resurrection; And on the other hand, it is to present a picture of their claims to clarify their rationality.
As the results of the discussion, it becomes clear that Hick's claim does not maintain the necessity of personal identity of bodies. Baker confuses psychological judgments with metaphysical judgments. Corcoran assumes one of the beliefs and assumptions of Christianity, which is the obligatory divine contract and also the absolute power of God.Van Ewagen, believing in the change of body, and Zimmerman, believing in the division of the body on the Day of Judgment, turn the human being into atomic pieces, which is nothing but the main parts, i.e., the brain, or nothing but the budding of the body; It is unclear which one of these separate existences is human and which one is addressed on the Day of Judgment. Although it finally becomes clear that the aforementioned philosophers are unable to logically solve the time and place gap that arises between the first body and the afterlife and also explain how to preserve personal identity, it is not proven that physical resurrection is prevented by preserving personal identity
کلیدواژهها [English]